West of Barcelona, in the head coach's meeting room at the Joan Gamper Sports City.
Martino was studying the match between Real Madrid and Real Betis intently with his team of assistants.
Martino, who was once a professional footballer, had played in the Argentine domestic league. On March 1, 1991, he was loaned to Tenerife in La Liga.
Interestingly, his first game for Tenerife was away at Camp Nou against Barcelona.
Martino, playing as an attacking midfielder, completed the full ninety minutes. The only thing he left behind from that match was a yellow card.
In the remaining three months, Martino featured in 15 matches for Tenerife, starting 13 and coming on as a substitute in 2. He scored one goal and collected six yellow cards.
Such statistics were not enough for him to stay in La Liga, so he returned to Argentina at the end of the season.
After retiring, Martino went on to coach several teams, but never in Europe.
Whether as a player or as a coach, he lacked experience in European football, which caused an uproar when Barcelona chose him as their head coach. Almost everyone questioned whether such a man was worthy of Barcelona.
But the Barcelona board still decided on Martino.
To make up for his weaknesses, Barcelona equipped him with a powerful backroom staff.
Among them were four assistant coaches. Jordi Roura, who had served as Vilanova's assistant, as well as Jorge Pautasso and Adrián Coria, two long-time partners of Martino.
But the most crucial figure was Joan Francesc Ferrer, nicknamed "Rubi."
The 43-year-old Rubi was already well-known in Spanish football. Although he had only coached in lower leagues, he had made a name for himself the previous season.
He had taken charge of Girona when they were struggling to avoid relegation and led them to 4th place in the Segunda División. Girona even passed the first round of the promotion play-offs before eventually losing to Almería in the final.
Although he failed to reach La Liga, Rubi's coaching ability had been widely recognized.
Given this, Barcelona invited him to be Martino's right-hand man.
This was not the first time Barcelona had done something similar.
During the Dream Team II era, Rijkaard worked alongside Ten Cate. Rijkaard lacked experience, while Ten Cate had just made his mark in the Eredivisie. Their cooperation created the Barcelona Dream Team II dynasty.
The Barcelona management, led by Rosell, hoped that Martino and Rubi could replicate the success of Rijkaard and Ten Cate.
Besides the four assistants, other coaching staff were responsible for specific duties, along with two match analysts, Alex Garcia and Jordi Melero.
To ensure the stability of Martino's tenure, the board spared no effort in assembling a luxurious coaching team.
…
The Barcelona coaching staff gathered to watch the Real Madrid vs Real Betis match.
Alex Garcia and Jordi Melero analyzed Real Madrid's lineup and tactics, highlighting two key aspects.
One in attack, and one in defense.
Defensively, in the match against Betis, Gao Shen instructed the two full-backs to push high and actively participate in attacks. This left Casemiro, Ramos, and Varane covering at the back.
But this had layers to it.
Casemiro shielded the defense, protecting the two center-backs. Yet, because the full-backs pressed so high, whenever Betis attacked behind them, Ramos and Varane would pull wide and act almost like full-backs.
At that point, Casemiro would drop back into the center-back position.
"To some extent, Real Madrid's defensive line switches between three at the back, four at the back, and even five at the back. It is very flexible and multi-layered."
Up front, Real Madrid's trident in this game consisted of Ronaldo, Džeko, and Isco. But throughout the match, their positions were not fixed. They constantly rotated.
For instance, Isco often drifted to the left flank, even popping up around Barcelona's left corner of the penalty area.
Ronaldo and Džeko also frequently adjusted their positions. This fluidity made it extremely difficult to defend.
The simplest way would be to mark Isco or Džeko as tightly as Ronaldo, but that clearly would not work.
The reverse was also true.
Through this positional interchanging, Betis defenders were dragged all over the place.
"We can fully expect that at the Bernabéu, Gao Shen will line up Ronaldo, Benzema, and Di María as the front three. Their individual quality and chemistry will be even stronger. That will be a major test for our defense."
Martino had been listening silently until the analysts finished. Then he spoke: "In Argentina, we call this circulation, movement, and rotation. In Bielsa's philosophy, circulation is a crucial part."
Since Bielsa's success in Argentina, almost the entire new generation of Argentine coaches had been deeply influenced by him because of his radical football.
Everyone turned to Martino, waiting for him to continue. Many picked up pens, ready to take notes.
"I have watched last season's four clásicos over and over again, and I found one common theme: we pressed Real Madrid too high, and it was no accident."
Martino paused, then continued. "In almost every match against Gao Shen's Real Madrid, it was the same. We had possession, used our passing game to press them in their own half."
"We must admit it is thrilling to pin the opponent inside their half, it gets everyone's adrenaline pumping. But we must also recognize that when facing a team with top speed like Real Madrid, if we still use the half-pitch siege tactic, our defensive line is left very exposed."
His words shocked the Spanish coaches, including Roura and Rubi.
Ball possession had always been Barcelona's lifeline.
"You mean, we don't pursue possession?" Roura asked anxiously.
"No, no, Jordi, you misunderstood. We must still control the ball, but we should not trap the opponent in their half, or even in the 30-meter area. Against a team like Real Madrid, this is very dangerous."
"We should shift our possession zone from outside their 30-meter area to around the center line. This has many advantages. For example, when we transition from attack to defense, our midfield can support faster. Our forwards will also have more space to exploit."
"More importantly, the space behind us will shrink, making it harder for opponents to exploit."
At first glance, it made sense. But on closer thought, it raised problems.
"If we retreat to the halfway line, as you said, there are indeed advantages. But it also creates a problem. Our attack will start from deeper, farther from the opponent's goal," Rubi analyzed.
This idea was not new. Any coach with some tactical sense could think of it. The key was whether to choose it.
Barcelona's most dangerous weapon was their quick combination play. They thrived on short, sharp passing moves in tight spaces. Their best offense was "passing" the ball into the net.
But retreating meant being farther away from goal.
Originally, within 30 meters, one pass might be enough. Now it would take at least two.
Each extra pass added risk and slowed the tempo.
"You are right, Rubi. So we need to add more mid- and long-range passing into our attack and play at a higher tempo," Martino explained.
Roura and Rubi exchanged a glance, their faces showing an expression of "just as we thought."
As distance increased, the passes had to lengthen.
But that also meant players became less connected, easier to isolate.
This was not a problem in Argentina, South America, or even non-top European leagues.
In Portugal or the Netherlands, this might still work. Because players' individual abilities often made up the difference.
But in La Liga, especially in the Champions League, this approach was unacceptable.
When players got isolated, forced into individual duels, the team's attack collapsed.
The defensive strength of Europe's top leagues, even La Liga, was on a completely different level compared to South America.
"Tata, I admit your idea makes sense. But Barcelona has its own traditions, and we hold to them. I think you need to think carefully," Roura said.
He could not outright tell Martino that he did not understand the defensive intensity of La Liga or that he lacked European experience.
If he did, he would have to pack his bags immediately.
But that was the truth, wasn't it?
Once Barcelona's spacing stretched, and connections weakened, could they still play their football?
Mid- and long-range passing?
With longer distances, passing accuracy and ball control inevitably dropped. What would be the cost? Had he considered it?
"I understand, Jordi," Martino chuckled, "but I think you should approach our problems with a more creative mindset."
"If sticking to Barcelona's traditions and philosophy really worked, then why were they beaten so badly by Real Madrid last season? Why have we failed to beat Gao Shen's team for so many years?"
Martino's rhetorical question pierced straight to the heart. It was a soul-searching question.
Apart from Messi's presence, a big reason Barcelona hired him was the hope that an outsider would bring fresh thinking. That he would inject vitality beyond Barcelona's ingrained philosophy.
If they considered tradition in everything, how could they change?
Wouldn't that just mean standing still?
Roura and Rubi were speechless.
But deep down, both had a bad feeling.
They could only hope it was just their imagination.
The two exchanged a look, saw the same unease in each other's eyes, and silently prayed.
(To be continued.)